Distributed knowledge based applications in open domain rely on common sense infor mation which is bound to be uncertain and incomplete. To draw the useful conclusions from ambiguous data, one must address un certainties and conflicts incurred in a holis tic view. No integrated frameworks are vi able without an in-depth analysis of con flicts incurred by uncertainties. In this pa per, we give such an analysis and based on the result, propose an integrated framework. Our framework extends definite argumenta tion theory to model uncertainty. It sup ports three views over conflicting and uncer tain knowledge. Thus, knowledge engineers can draw different conclusions depending on the application context (i.e. view). We also give an illustrative example on strategical de cision support to show the practical useful ness of our framework.
INTRODUCTION
Expert systems rely on common sense knowledge which is conflicting and uncertain. Conflicts and un certainties are not orthogonal but intertwined. Uncer tainties usually lead to conflicts and conflicts usually result in uncertainties. Thus, any practical expert sys tems must address both aspects.
Logic-based information reasoning is an interesting do main where conflicts, in the form of partial and oppos ing arguments, are unavoidable. With an eye on this particular domain, we propose a framework to capture the notion of conflict and resolve it under uncertain ties.
The most widely used methodology for tackling con flicts and uncertainties are model-based approaches like classical logic. Owing to their declarative nature, they have difficulties in discerning different kinds of conflicts. On the other hand, argumentation, a reviv ing integrated approach, gives promising results ad dressing this issue. It studies not only models of knowl edge bases but also their structures, derivations and conflicts. Unifying these studies can lead to a deeper understanding of uncertain and conflicting knowledge bases.
John Pollock pioneered the research of defeasible argu mentation (Pollock, 1990 ) but he only concentrated on probability analysis of the topic. P. M. Dung (Dung, 1995b) and Robert Kowalski (Kowalski and Toni, 1996) investigated how argumentation subsume other non-monotonic logics and logic programming frame works with minimalistic settings. Gerard Vreeswijk (Vreeswijk, 1997) employed argumentation to model multi-agent systems in a completely abstract way. Henry Prakken shed light on argumentation for prag matic legal applications with his extended logic pro gramming framework. Bart Verheij (Verheij, 1996) unified all contemporary argumentation within his two frameworks. Our framework differs from these re searches in that we concentrate on conflicts and un certainties in a distributed setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec tion 2, we describe our approach of modeling uncer tainties in argumentation and the conflicts that may pertain to such a setting. After introducing various definitions in Section 3, Section 4 and 5 outline the conflicts and possible resolution methods, respectively.
We proceed to semantical analysis in Section 6 and dialectical analysis of proof-theory in Section 7. In Section 8, we describe how our framework relates to existing ones. In Section 9, a typical application of our framework is outlined. In the conclusion, Section 10, we discuss shortcomings of our framework and propose future work. 
Background
Uncertainty takes many forms. In many application domains, quantitative measures of uncertainty are dif ficult to obtain Paul Krause and Fox, 1995) , e.g. logic based information retrieval, rule based analysis, etc. In this paper, we focus on qualitative aspects of uncertainty. Undoubtedly, logic is one of the most powerful qualitative approaches. In classi cal model-based analysis of logic, entailment relation is declarative. Inference structure is not important as long as a fact can be derived. This is clearly undesir able for uncertainty reasoning. To draw useful conclu sions from a set of potentially conflicting and uncertain knowledge, we must know the structural aspect of in ferencing. We must know in what way conclusions are drawn and at which step conflicts are introduced.
Argumentation is a variant of logic which can attack conflicts from their structures. Briefly, it was revived by Toulmin's book (Toulmin, 1958) . Since then, many potential applications of the theory in nonmonotonic reasoning have been suggested (Lin, 1993; Lin and Shoham, ) . The methodology of argumentation shows great similarity to the logic programming paradigm. As a result, various attempts (Dung, 1995a; Dung, 1995b; Prakken and Sartor, 1997) have been made on blending the practical usefulness of logic programming and the philosophical insight of argumentation.
In this paper, we show that argumentation is also applicable and, in fact, well-suited to the problem of uncertainty reasoning. Inspired by the work of Dung (Dung, 1995b) and Prakken (Prakken and Sar tor, 1997) , our framework is based on logic pro gramming. We represent knowledge with Extended Disjunctive Logic Program (EDLP) (Gelfond and Lif schitz, 1991) which is an extension of their frame work. We introduce disjunctive in the head of a clause for representing uncertain information. For example, {r1 : dog_bark -t stranger V arson} means "a dog barks if either it sees a stranger or an arson".
2.2

Our Framework
Our argumentation framework assumes a set of distributed knowledge based systems (KESs) (or agents). Conflicts are divided into two levels, namely The problem of reasoning in a distributed setting is then not to change either KBSs as other parts of them rely on their own views. The objective is therefore to recognize differences between different views j opinions yet still enables knowledge engineers to draw useful conclusions out of them. The discrepancies between distributed KBSs may lead to non-logical contradic tion, and this is very difficult to model simply by clas sical logic.
DEFINITION
Formally, our argumentation framework is defined, in a top-down fashion, as follows: If a literall is an atom a then lis ...,a. If l is ..., a then lis a. An argumentation system AS is a binary-tuple < Ags, Pg > where Ags is a collection of distributed argumentation agents and Pg is a preference hierarchy between these agents. An argumentation agent Ag is a binary-tuple < R, P > where R is a set of rules and P is a preference hierarchy between these rules. A preference hierarchy P is a set of ordered pair in which we say "sis preferred than g" (denoted by s > g) if and only if < s, g >E P. A rule is an EDLP clause of the form, where r is the name of the rule, a1 , ••. , an are all literals, ,... ., is the non-provable sign1. We denote Cd(r) = {a1, ... , am}, Cn(r) = {am+l, ... , an} , Strong(Cd(r)) = {all··· ,al} and Weak(Cd(r)) = {al+1, ... ,am}· An argument Arg is a finite sequence of rules {ro, ... , TN} in which every rule ri satisfies the following conditions.
1. If p E Strong(Cd(ri)) then there exists r E {ro, ... , ri-d and p = certain(r).
2. There exists q E Cn(ri) and denoted as
The function certain denotes a "definite" reading of an "indefinite" clause. certain(r) denotes a literal in the conclusion of an indefinite rule such that all other literals are pruned by their complementary counter parts other rules' certain. For example, the value of certain (r2) is a in the following argument:
Condition 1 ensures that every rule in an argument must be grounded. Conditions 2 and 3 ensure that a rule must have a unique meaning and rules in argument are not redundant, respectively. Re striction imposed by condition 2 is for the sake of sim plicity in demonstrating inter-KBS-conflicts.
CONFLICTS WITHIN A KBS
Under our framework, conflicts within a K BS is re ferred to as intra-KBS-conflicts. As an example, con sider the following segment of a legal knowledge base <R,P>.
From the above, the following arguments are found:
2. Arg2 entails Arg1 and r6. Irrespective of the out come of the proof of ownership (r7 ), Arg2 al ways leads to the conclusion that the murderer should be puLinto_jail. Thus, both murderer and puLinto_jail are certain() in Arg1. Next, we shall consider conflicts pertaining to uncer tainties between different KBSs. When knowledge is distributed over a set of agents, it is not uncommon to see that the same piece of knowledge represented differently in different agents. For example, Table 1 shows two agents, Agh and Agt2, which possess two variants of the same knowledge. It is intuitive to see that Agh will conclude puLinto_jail whereas Agt2 will not, owing to the uncertainty in r5. A direct merge of Agh and Agh will lead to puLinto_jail as Agh domi nates the union in the sense of classical logic. However, such conclusion essentially assumes certain informa tion with higher preference than uncertain information and is credulous in this regard. It is arguable that on what basis can we bear this assumption and cherish certain information rather than uncertain one? And on what basis we want to do it the other way round? 
Credulous View
From the viewpoint of classical logic, we can interpret a rule r2 as a revision of another rule r5 if one shows that r5 is too loose a statement (see Table 1 ). This is exactly what embedded in the essence of classical logic. We called this a credulous view of distributed knowledge.
In many traditional reasoning frameworks, without the non-provability sign ""'• credulous view can help to. enlarge the set of positive information. However, this is not the case for our framework and most other non-monotonic systems which attack default reason ing. This can be shown by the following example which consists of two agents Agtt and Agt2 (see Table 1 ).
If we adopt the approach of classical logic, Agtt will clearly out-rate Agt2. Further, r3 is not applicable and hence, release is not deduced (which is deducible un der skeptical view, defined in the next section). Thus, credulous view is not necessarily additive in the pres ence of a skeptical view.
5.2
Skeptical View
Whe:ri our multi-agent framework is applied to the le gal reasoning domain, credulous inference is highly un desirable due to the spirit of " proof beyond any reason able doubts". Consider the last example, if ownership is also a plausible explanation for the evidence of one's finger print on an object, then how can we arrive at the conclusion of murderer with certainty? In fact, it is the job of the defense legal agent, in practice, to re trieve as many uncertain information as possible from legal knowledge bases and use them to presents "rea sonable doubts". Under such circumstances, we would prefer Agt2 's view to Agh. Such preference is actually a form of suppression and reveals conflicts between dif ferent KESs. Notice that this type of conflict aroused because of the great similarity between two variants of the same piece of information being distributed. In syntactic form, we introduce Inter-KBS-conflicts pertain to any inference schema which supports qualitative uncertainties like disjunc tive in a distributed knowledge setting. A straight forward resolution scheme to inter-KBS-conflicts is to eliminate the additional uncertainties introduced, i.e.
Cn(rt) -Cn(r2).
For intra-KBS-conflicts, rules related to the judgment is easily defined. It is, however, not the same for inter KBS-conflicts. As inter-KBS-conflicts aroused because of the additional uncertainties in a rule, we consider a set of auxiliary rules to determine the defeating status 1. If a rule r1 thins a rule r2 , the set of auxiliary rules is auxiliary(r1,r2) = {Cd(r1) --+ qlq E (Cn(rt)-Cn(r2))} and every rule is an alias of r1 in preference hierarchy.
2. An argument Arg is not defeated by a rule r1 if r1 thins a rule r2 in Arg and for every auxiliary ruler in auxiliary(r1, r2), there exists an justified argument defeating it.
To illustrate the idea here, let us consider the exam ple in Table 1 again. There is an argument Arg1 = { rt, r2, r6} in Agh. By definition, r5 and r2 of Arg1 show inter-KBS-conflict. The set of auxiliary rules is defined as,
To maintain Arg1 's undefeated status, additional ar guments must be found to defeat auxiliary rules in auxiliary(r5, r2). However, there is no such a rule in Agh UAgt2.
Similar to credulous view, skeptical view also does not give us more certain information in reasoning. Con sideration of the simple example in the last subsection helps to illustrate this behavior. If we consider r5 as a thinning attacker, puLinto_jail cannot be derived from Agh. Thus, a skeptical view does not, in gen eral, enlarge the set of facts concluded.
5.3
Generalized Skeptical View
In a skeptical view, we only focus on a particular type of similarity between disjunctive clauses. In this section, we extend the analysis to general similarity between two similar but yet distributed disjunctive clauses. In Table 2 , we show the generalization of conflicting clauses of this kind. In the The notion of similarity is an extension of the skeptical view in which only subsumption is considered. In this extended setting, Rc and Rv are conflicting and Rv thins Argc. To determine the result, we consider the status of the rules involved, i.e. the unique meaning of Rc in Argc .
In both situations, we show that a generalized skep tical view does not introduce new things and can be tackled by the following techniques:
• There exists arguments defeating Cn(Rc) -eertain(Rc ).
• r <; {Cn(Rc)-eertain(Rc)}.
• Thus, there exists arguments defeating r.
• Rc degenerates to R'c : C ond ::::} Cone.
• The problem is then reduced to subsumption problem in previous section -R'c: Cond::::} Cone -Rv: Cond::::} Cone V A 2. Case 2: If eertain(Rc) E r,
• There exists arguments defeating Cone.
• The problem degenerates into -R'c : Cond::::} r -Rv: Cond::::} Cone V A
• The conflict criteria are no longer met and thus can be neglect.
The simplicity achieved in Case 2 is due to our unique meaning restriction imposed on the argument defini tion. The situation will be extremely complex when the restriction is relaxed.
SEMANTICS
Now we have the bells and whistles to define our argu mentation semantics for resolving conflicts under un certainties. Formally, our semantics is based on a fix point operator II which operates on two sets of ar guments ArgSet and S. IIs(ArgSet) gives a subset of S such that all their counter-argumentsfdefeaters are strictly defeated by arguments in Arg. It can be proved that II is monotone in credulous view, skeptical view and generalized skeptical view. The fix-point op erator II is essentially the same as Prakken's (Prakken and Sartor, 1997) . Our semantics differ from his in the definition of "strictly defeat" which is the core con cept of argumentation. Indeed, there are three kinds of fix-point operator. The key point is in what way the notion of counter-argument is interpreted. Table  3 summarizes the notion of counter-argument for dif ferent views shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. To achieve monotonicity, the fix-point operator II re lies on the notions of asymmetric order ( "strictly de feat") which we introduced in the previous sections.
By K naster-Tarski theorem, the fix-point II* of II with respect to a set of argument S exists and can be ob tained as below.
Let ArgSet be the set of all arguments which can be constructed from an argumentation system AS. An argument Arg is justified with respect to AS if and only if Arg E II A.rg Set; it is defeated if and only if there exists a justified argument Arg' E AS strictly defeating it; and it is arguable, otherwise.
DIALECTICAL PROOF THEORY
Dung proposed a dialectical proof theory for argumen tation in (Dung, 1995b) . Prakken adopted it in his fixed priority framework. As the proof-theory is de fined on arguments, we show that a simplified version of it can also be used in our framework.
A proof of an argument is defined on an argument tree. Each internal/external node is an argument and their child nodes are their defeaters. An argument tree T is constructed as below.
1. Level 1 is the proposition to be justified.
2. At an odd (even) level, a proponent (opponent) makes moves to strictly defeat all (any) moves from opponents (proponents) at previous levels.
3. In any branch, an opponent cannot make the same move twice.
A proponent is said to win a branch of an argument tree if and only if the opponent cannot make any fur ther move at the branch; and said to win an argument tree if and only if it wins all branches. An argument Arg is provably justified if it wins an argument tree at level 1; it is provably defeated if it is defeated by a provably justified argument; and it is provably ar guable, otherwise. It can be shown that an argument Arg is provably justified with respect to an argumenta tion system AS if and only if it is justified with respect to AS 2 .
RELATION TO EXIS TING FRAMEWORKS
It is easy to see that our approach collapses to Prakken's strict argumentation framework (Prakken and Sartor, 1997) when only one knowledge base is present or the set of knowledge bases is non disjunctive. Further, all arguments in rebuttal con flicts are arguable if priority is not available. In that situation, our framework reduces to partial semantics similar to Prakken's (Prakken and Sartor, 1997) .
2 See appendix for details 9
AN ILLUS TRATIVE EXAMPLE
A company would like to perform strategically plan ning and seek an answer to the following question: Based on the current economic situations, is it prof itable to start a new production line?
To proceed, the company consulted two strategic plan ning experts, experts A and B. It was hoped that in dividual analysis from two independent sources could help review the intricacies of the scenario. Table 4 depicts knowledge set K B A and K B B extracted from expert A and B, respectively. The global order be tween experts is A > B. In KBA, {A6, A1, As, A7, A4, A2} form an argu ment Arg1 . The unique meaning of Arg1 is new_productiordine which suggests a new production line for the business. { A7, A5} form another argument Arg2. Arg2 concludes that the market is stable which is contrary to the rule A3 in Arg1 . By definition, Arg2 rebut Arg1 . According to K B A's preference hierar chy, Arg1 wins. Thus, Arg1 is justified with respect to
KBA.
In KBB, {Bg,B1,B4,B2} form an argument Arg3, {B 3 } form Arg4, {B6,B5} form Arg5, {B7,B8} form Arg6. Arg3 is undercut by Arg5 which is then rebuted by Arg6. Arg3 undercuts Arg4. According to the pref erence hierarchy, Arg6 strictly defeats Arg5 and Arg3 is then justified. Arg4 is strictly defeated by the jus tified argument Arg3.
Consider the notion of skeptical view, we notice that A1 of KBA and B1 of KBB are similar knowledge about the relation among "adversary financial factor" , "economic grow" and "demand grow". By definition, B1 thins Arg1, the argument with A1. The auxiliary rule is then,
To defeat B1 and restore Arg1 's justified status, we have to find arguments rebutting Ai. However, there is no such arguments. Thus, we have two different conclusions from KBA and KBB. Credulous view suggests a new production line whereas skeptical view does not suggest any strategic moves. The result is close to our intuitive understanding of credulous rea soning and skeptical reasoning.
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CONCLUS ION
In this paper, we have discussed the inherent assump tion in classical logic 3 and how it affects distributed reasoning under uncertainties. We have proposed an integrated framework for handling both intra-KBS� conflicts and inter-KBS-conflicts holistically. Further more, we have also discussed the general aspects of inter-KBS-conflicts for uncertainty reasoning.
As it is, our argumentation model is a little bit re strictive. It only works well in near horn (Reed et al., ) knowledge systems. Relaxing that restriction will lead us either to Stable semantics ( Gelfond and Lifs chitz, ) or Well-founded semantics (Ross, 1989) . Such an extension not only bridges our framework to other frameworks in non-monotonic reasoning but also fa cilitates the modeling of more complex problems. In either way, it would be interesting to see how inter KBS-conflicts are modeled and resolved. These lay down the core of our future work. Verheij, B. (1996) . Rules, Reasons, Arguments -For mal studies of argumentation and defeat. PhD thesis, Universiteit Maastricht. Vreeswijk, G. (1997) . Abstract argumentation sys tems. Artificial Intelligence, 90(1-2) :225-279.
A APPENDIX
Before going into the soundness and completeness proof, we shall introduce the following notations to simplify the proof procedure.
For an argument Ar g,
• tree(Ar g) is the argument tree in which Ar g wins;
• branch(T) is the set of branches of an argument tree T;
• length(B) is the length of a branch;
• move(B, n) is the nth move of a branch B;
• player(M) is the player that responsible for the move M.
The proofs shown here are in Lampor t style (Lamport, 1993) .
Monotone Proof
Lemma 1 Given a set of argument S and conflict free subset S; and Si+1 � S;. If an argument Ar g is in ITs(S;) then Ar g is also in IIs(S;+l). PROOF: A direct rephrasing of lemma 1.
Soundness Proof
Lemma 2 If arguments Ar g is provably justified, then there exists an argument tree such that every move of the proponent in every branch involves only justified arguments.
PROOF SKETCH: We prove the lemma by induction on the level of tree(Ar g). Let h be the height of tree(Ar g). We argue that all proponent moves at level h are justified. By backward induction, we argue that proponent moves at odd level i must also be justified based on justified proponent moves at level i + 2. AssuME: 1. 3 tree(Ar g) s.t. Ar g wins all branches.
2. n = length(tree(Ar g))
